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ILLINOIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF-
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the most significant development in Ohio criminal pro-
cedure has been the enactment of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy
Act.' The purpose of this act is to provide a statutory proceeding by
which a prisoner convicted under Ohio law could present to a court his
claims that the proceeding leading to his conviction was constitutionally
void or voidable. The method of presenting these claims under the
statute was designed to be nontechnical, adequate, and independent
of other post-conviction remedies available under Ohio law. The effect
desired by the General Assembly in enacting the statute was to reduce
the number of habeas corpus petitions filed in Ohio.2 It was hoped
that by shifting the burden of determining the merits of these consti-
tutional claims to the original courts of conviction there would be a
subsequent reduction in the use of habeas corpus. Because of an un-
derstandable lack of Ohio case law interpreting the statute, the result
has been that many Ohio judges and attorneys must now conduct
post-conviction proceedings with only minimal guidance from the
statute itself.
It has been suggested that the Ohio bench and bar might find
initial guidance in Illinois opinions and experiences dealing with its
post-conviction statute. An appropriate presentation of the Illinois
case law construing its post-conviction hearing statute8 should be par-
ticularly useful in solving those problems raised by the Ohio statute
that have not been resolved by the Ohio courts. However, it seems
necessary that a discussion of the Illinois experience should be tailored
in two particular respects. First, specific sections of the Illinois statute
will be related to corresponding sections of the Ohio statute where the
intent and meaning require such treatment. Also, only those Illinois
decisions, procedures, and policies which have utility in the Ohio situa-
tion will be considered.
An immediate problem presented by the Ohio post-conviction
statute is who may file a petition under the statute. The Ohio statute
uses the introductory phrase: "a prisoner in custody under sentence";
4
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1965).
2 See Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N..2d 885 (1965). The Ohio
Supreme Court, per curiam, concluded that the availability of the post-conviction remedies
in Ohio is a ground for the denial of the remedy of habeas corpus in pending as well as in
future actions.
8 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
4 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965).
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this phrase, of course, is less restrictive than the Illinois phrase, "im-
prisoned in the penitentiary."5 The Ohio statutory words, "custody"
and "sentence," are easily applied in most cases, but they present
difficulties in their application to the more unusual situations. In the
ordinary situation "custody" stresses the fact of custody rather than
the place of custody because no specific place is mentioned, as is found
in the Illinois statute. Thus it follows that an Ohio prisoner is in
custody whether he is incarcerated in the state penitentiary, the Lima
Mental Hospital, or a state honor farm. But the fact of custody is
less than precise when the petitioner, for example, is sentenced to serve
ten consecutive weekends in the county jail. The question arises
whether his remedy under the Ohio statute exists only while he is
actually confined. If the response is in the affirmative, then the statute
would require that the petitioner file his petition for relief on a week-
end, and that the court should only hear his petition on the weekend.
This restricted approach would produce an absurdity; common sense
dictates that the fact of constructive custody should be sufficient
under the statute.
The interpretation of the statutory word, "sentence," also presents
difficulties. Admittedly in most instances the petitioner filing under
the statute will be attacking the very conviction for which he is serving
sentence. But in an occasional case, the petitioner will seek to set
aside a conviction for which he is not presently serving. In that situa-
tion fairness and justice would dictate that he should be permitted to
attack a conviction when he can establish a reasonable relationship
between the conviction and the sentence which he is serving. This
rule would permit a prisoner convicted of recidivism to attack the
underlying conviction because he would be able to establish the rela-
tionship between the sentence which he is serving and the earlier con-
viction.' However, a more difficult problem is presented when the
5 IM. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964). judicial interpretation of the
statutory word "penitentiary" which is used in the statute has extended the scope of the
Illinois act to include any person convicted of a serious crime and imprisoned at the
time that they file a post-conviction petition. Thus, women in the reformatory and men
on death row in the Cook County jail could invoke the procedure because they were
convicted of serious crimes. But those persons who have been finally released or who are
on parole or who have been convicted of minor crimes are not within the scope of the
Illinois statute because the word "penitentiary" has been construed to limit the scope of
the remedy. See People v. Dale, 406 IM. 238, 246-47, 92 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1950).
6 See also People v. Frandere, 47 IM. App. 2d 436, 198 N.E.2d 170 (1964), in which
the court analyzed the relationship necessary between the sentence and the proceeding
challenged in the post-conviction proceeding. In that case petitioner was placed on five
years probation after pleading guilty to three indictments of auto theft. While on proba-
tion he was ordered to appear at a probation board hearing in order to show cause why
his probation should not be revoked. The result of the hearing was that petitioner's
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petitioner is serving consecutive prison sentences which do not have
a corresponding relationship. For example, suppose that a petitioner
has been sentenced in one trial to fifteen years in prison and in a second
trial to ten years in prison. While serving the fifteen year sentence
petitioner wants to attack the constitutionality of the second trial on
the ground that his right to an impartial jury was violated. Should the
petitioner be barred from attacking the second conviction for which
he has not begun serving the sentence imposed? Here again policy
would dictate that the statute would give the petitioner the right to
attack the second conviction. He is "a prisoner in custody under
sentence," and the only difficulty is that he is not serving the sentence
imposed by the second conviction. Obvious unfairness would result if
he had to wait until the first sentence ended before he could file his
petition. At that time, the evidence would be stale and in many in-
stances nonexistent.
"A prisoner in custody under sentence" seeking post-conviction
relief must first file a verified petition in the court which imposed sen-
tence.' At that point three general questions which demand specific
application to the filed petition must be answered. These questions are
as follows: Does the petition show entitlement to relief, what effect
should be given the doctrines of waiver and res judicata, and what pro-
cedure should the Ohio court of conviction apply in disposing of the
petition? It is in answering these general questions that the Illinois
experience with its statute becomes helpful. A detailed consideration of
each step taken under the Illinois statute can aid the parties in their
preparation and the Ohio judge in the eventual disposition of a petition
filed in his court.
Before considering in detail each step followed in the Illinois
post-conviction remedy procedure, it is useful from an organizational
probation was revoked in each of the three cases, and that he was sentenced to the
penitentiary for concurrent terms of two to six years. While serving his sentence in the
penitentiary the petitioner filed a petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act
in which he asked that the orders revoking his probation be set aside. The appellate court
reversed the lower court decision and granted a rehearing for revocation of probation for
lack of evidence but affirmed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition because it
pertained exclusively to matters involved in the proceeding which resulted in the revoca-
tion of his probation.
But the situation in Franciere must be contrasted to the situation concerned in the
conviction for recidivism. In the latter situation the earlier conviction whih is being
attacked in the post-conviction petition is the basis for the conviction and sentence for
recidivism. Thus, if the earlier conviction were voidable, the result would be that the
conviction for recidivism would be questionable because of the direct relationship. For
the federal approach to "standing," see Comment, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 302, 312 (1966).
7 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965).
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standpoint to take an overview of the remedy. The general principles to
be employed by the trial court in adjudicating a petition under the
Illinois statute were examined by the Illinois Supreme Court in People
v. Jennings." In that case the court set out the judicial steps which were
to be taken under the statute by the lower courts in their disposition
of a post-conviction petition. The principles involved present a basic
outline of the remedy. The steps and their basic guiding principles, in
summarized form, are as follows:
(1) The post-conviction court must find that the petition suffi-
ciently invokes the remedy provided by the statute. A petition which
is sufficient under the Illinois statute contains substantial allegations
of denial of constitutional rights together with supporting affidavitsY
A sufficient petition calls for an answer by the state's attorney and a
hearing on the merits. An insufficient petition is subject to a motion
to dismiss by the State's attorney.'
(2) The court must find that the claims in the petition have
not been waived. If the court finds that there has been waiver of the
particular claims, it should deny relief. In addition, the court must find
that the claims have not been adjudicated against the petitioner in
8 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
0 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964). The Illinois statute requires
that there be "a petition ... verified by affidavit," and yet the Ohio statute requires only
"a verified petition." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965). In Illinois, if
there is a lack of affidavits supporting the verification, the trial court may dismiss the
petition if this lack is neither excused nor explained. While the Ohio statute does not
require affidavits, dismissal of an unverified petition would appear to be proper. But in
the rare case in which an Ohio prisoner would file an unverified petition, it would seem
appropriate for the court to permit an amendment in order to conform the petition to
the statutory requirements. The Illinois courts can allow the petitioner additional time
to complete proper verification. People v. Jennings, supra note 8, at 26, 102 N.E.2d at 827.
10 The Ohio approach to the question of a sufficient petition filed under the statute
is governed by Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965), which states in part: "Unless
the petition and the files and records of the case show to the satisfaction of the court
that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
on the prosecuting attorney .... " The Ohio statute requires that the post-conviction court
initially examine the petition and its supporting material in order to determine if the
petitioner has stated grounds in his petition, which if true, would be sufficient to invoke
the statutory remedy. If the court finds that the petition filed is sufficient in that relief
might be given, the prosecuting attorney must be notified. But if the court determines that
the petition is insufficient, then it would be proper for the court to dismiss the petition
on its own motion. The difference between the Ohio statute and the Illinois statute is
that in Illinois the State's attorney must move to dismiss the petition, while in Ohio, the
trial judge may dismiss the petition without relying on the prosecutor. The result is that
in Illinois the state must act as soon as the petition is filed, and in Ohio the state must only
act in the case of a sufficient petition.
1966]
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another proceeding which was free from constitutional defect. In the
absence of such a finding, res judicata bars relief to the petitioner under
the statute.
(3) The court must find that the petitioner has proved the truth
of the allegations contained in his petition.
If the post-conviction hearing court finds in favor of the peti-
tioner, it is the duty of that court to set aside the judgment of convic-
tion and to enter supplemental orders." If the court however finds
against the petitioner in any one of these three steps, it is the duty of
the court to dismiss the petition.
II. PETITIONS ENTITLED TO RELIEF
A petitioner, who files a petition which clearly alleges that in the
proceedings which have resulted in his conviction there was a substan-
tial denial of a constitutional right, has filed a petition which is entitled
to relief if the allegations are true. 12 Post-conviction relief is the end
result desired by each petitioner, but his success is dependent on how
well he can establish that there has been a substantial denial of his
constitutional rights. Indeed some petitions allege procedural errors,
while others allege abridgments of substantive rights. Some petitions
are dismissed on motion by the state, others are entitled to a hearing
on the merits. Still others are dismissed after the hearing and some result
in the setting aside of the conviction. This particular section of the
comment considers what petitions are entitled to a hearing under the
statute.
A. Procedural Matters
Most post-conviction petitions which allege only procedural errors
will be dismissed by the hearing court on motion by the State's attor-
ney. This is because the allegation does not usually disclose the denial
of a constitutional right.13 The Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Hartman4 has supplemented this ruling with a policy reason:
It certainly was not the intent of the General Assembly, by the new
act in question, to enable a person convicted of a crime to have a
review of ordinary questions of procedure, for which the law already
provides a remedy, by charging that they constitute a denial of
constitutional rights. 5
The requirement is that a constitutional right when alleged in a
11 People v. Jennings, supra note 8, at 27, 102 N.E.2d at 827.
12 Id. at 26, 102 N.E.2d at 827.
13 People v. Farley, 408 IlL. 288, 294, 96 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1951).
14 408 M11. 133, 96 N.E.2d 449 (1951).
15 Id. at 137, 96 N.E.2d at 451.
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post-conviction petition must necessarily involve a constitutional ques-
tion.'" The mere assertion of a constitutional right is not sufficient.
Thus the appellate cases which have considered the availability of the
post-conviction remedy to resolve procedural errors have generally
held that the errors did not present constitutional issues. For example,
an allegation claiming that the indictment was insufficient was con-
sidered by the court to be without constitutional merit.17 Again an
allegation in a post-conviction petition claiming that the trial court
improperly allowed a continuance to the state was held to have been
dismissed properly.' 8 Also trial errors by the presiding judge in ruling
on evidence' 9 and in giving an instruction to the jury2" were not found
to constitute allegations which would make a petition entitled to
relief.
While the general rule is that a post-conviction petition which
alleges procedural errors is properly dismissed without a hearing, there
are two notable exceptions. The Illinois courts have held that a petition
which alleges that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner is sufficient to invoke the post-conviction statute and
requires an answer from the State's attorney.21 The denial concerns
a procedural matter, but since it brings into question the validity of
the proceeding which resulted in the petitioner's imprisonment, it is
within the scope of the remedy because it raises the constitutional right
to due process.
Griffin v. Illinois22 raised the other notable exception to the general
rule when it ruled that the State of Illinois is required to provide a
stenographer's transcript or "other means of affording adequate and
effective appellate review .... ,,2' Because that case raised the avail-
ability of a record of the trial proceedings to an indigent defendant
16 See People v. Farley, supra note 13.
17 People v. Adams, 4 Ill. 2d 453, 455, 123 N.E.2d 327, 328 (1954).
18 See People v. Farley, supra note 13. The court noted that if the trial court did
commit error in allowing the continuance, that error could be easily reviewed by the
ordinary processes afforded for the review of convictions in criminal cases.
'9 People v. Kirkwood, 17 Dii. 2d 23, 25, 160 N.E.2d 766, 768 (1959).
20 People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225, 229, 115 N.E.2d 262, 264 (1953).
21 People v. Manning, 412 il. 519, 522, 107 N.E.2d 856, 857 (1952). Petitioner had
been found to be feeble-minded by an earlier court. He was then tried and convicted in a
different court. In his post-conviction petition he alleged that because the earlier court
still retained jurisdiction over him at the time of his conviction, the second court did
not have jurisdiction over him when he was tried and convicted. The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the dismissal of the lower court because it held that the petition was
sufficient to invoke the act.
22 351 US. 12 (1956).
23 Id. at 20.
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to the level of a constitutional right, the Illinois courts have held
that a petition alleging the denial of that right is sufficient to invoke
the remedy. 4 In comparing the general rule concerning procedural
errors to its exceptions, the result is that the court has adhered to its
original requirement that the post-conviction petition must allege a
denial of a constitutional right and that only those procedural errors
which violate constitutional rights can properly be a basis for relief
under the statute.
B. Substantive Rights
It is the abridgement of substantive rights which forms the basis
of most allegations found in post-conviction petitions; the typical peti-
tion alleges that the proceeding which resulted in the conviction of
the petitioner resulted in a denial or abridgement of his constitutional
rights. Such a petition is the focal point of the remedy provided by
the post-conviction statute:
The history of our Post-Conviction Hearing Act and the con-
struction placed upon it by this court establish that it provides, and
was meant to provide, an original and independent remedy by a
proceeding, civil in nature, to investigate into the existence of a sub-
stantial denial of the constitutional rights of a prisoner in the pro-
ceeding which resulted in his conviction.2 5
This statement clearly presents the principle aim of the Illinois
statute and the Ohio statute as well. Yet the aim gives little guidance
to the trial judge as to how to proceed with the emphasized words,
"substantial denial of the constitutional rights. . . ." It is therefore
necessary to suggest an approach which can be used by Ohio judges
in adjudicating any petition filed under the Ohio statute. The approach
would be to adopt a procedural technique which could be relied on in
each case to dispose properly of the post-conviction petition which has
been filed. This technique combines an analysis of the pivotal statutory
24 People v. Bragg, 16 Ill. 2d 336, 157 N.E.2d 57 (1959). In this case the notes which
were available to produce a transcript were made in the Munson system of shorthand. At
the time that petitioner wanted a transcript of his trial for post-conviction remedy
purposes, the Munson system had been in disuse for thirty years. The result was that the
production of the transcript would require some two hundred hours of work. The
Illinois Supreme Court ordered that a serious effort should be made to obtain a transcript,
and that the responsibility rested with the state. Compare Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420
(1963); United States v. Pate, 318 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1963), in which the court held
that when the transcripts are no longer available and the State of Ilinois is not hostile
or invidious, the fourteenth amendment does not require performance of the impossible;
for example, the production of a transcript when the reporter is dead or the notes have
been lost.
25 People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 615, 114 N.E.2d 706, 709 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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words with those decided cases which are dispositive of the issues of
law and fact raised by the post-conviction petition. Thus the principle
aim of the statute is carried out by examining the statutory words in
light of the federal and state cases which have decided like issues in
other remedies.
The technique when applied in Illinois is dependent on an analysis
of the phrase, "substantial denial of constitutional rights." A finding
by the court that this has occurred is the triggering event in setting
aside the petitioner's conviction.26 For purposes of analysis in using
the technique, the phrase may be considered as being composed of
three necessary elements: substantial, denial, and constitutional right.
In using these three elements as a basis for an approach to the disposi-
tion of the petition, it is better if they were considered in reverse
order, i.e., a constitutional right denied substantially.
The first determination which must be made by the post-convic-
tion judge is that the petition clearly concerns an existing constitu-
tional right." The petition must clearly identify which constitutional
right the petitioner is relying on in order to invoke the remedy of the
statute.28 The right alleged must be one which is guaranteed either by
the Constitution of the United States or of the State. In making this
initial determination relevant federal and state judicial opinions can
be examined to see if the petitioner did have the constitutional right
which he now claims.
Once the court finds that the petition clearly alleges a right which
is protected constitutionally, the trial judge must next determine if
the right has in fact been denied.29 Once again the petition must state
26 IM. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "Any person impris-
oned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his con-
viction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United
States or of the State of Illinois or both may institute a proceeding under this Article."
The Ohio act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965), uses the words: "such
a denial or infringement of the rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment void
or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States... .
In applying the technique in Ohio, these statutory words would be the basis of the
approach.
27 The Illinois statute uses the words, "his rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Illinois... ." 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd
1964) ; the Ohio statute uses the words, "The rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States.. .. " These phrases seem to express the same legislative intent although the
statutes are in different jurisdictions and the wording is not the same. Both require in
their ultimate effect that the petition be based on a constitutional right.
28 People v. Hartman, supra note 14, at 138, 96 NE.2d at 451.
29 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964) requires a "denial," but Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965) requires either a "denial or infringement."
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clearly in what respect the denial of the right has occurred. To com-
plete the determination of denial there must also be a finding that
the ultimate fact of denial has occurred in tie proceeding which re-
sulted in the petitioner's conviction.30 It is instructive to note in this
connection that the Ohio statute uses the words "denial and infringe-
ment" while the Illinois statute specifies only a denial. The Ohio
statute seems to require that the courts permit relief where the actions
complained of do not amount to a denial, but yet are of such an effect
as to deprive the petitioner of the constitutional rights guaranteed
to him.
Having found that there has been a denial of a constitutional
right, the judge must then determine if the denial was substantial.
While the word "substantial" is used in Illinois, in Ohio the trial judge
must determine if the denial was "such a denial" as to be "void or
voidable" constitutionally. 1 Both the Illinois and the Ohio standards
are, it is asserted, expressive of the concept of prejudice. Each statute
in using these words seeks to make certain that relief will only be af-
30 See generally People v. Heirens, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 NXE.2d 231 (1954). In this
case the petitioner Heirens was arrested and taken to a hospital at which sodium pentothal
was injected into him. Under the drug's influence he related the details of the murders
and robberies which he had committed. The police further administered a lie-detector test
without his permission. Later they searched his living quarters illegally. In his post-
conviction petition he alleged that these illegal acts and coercive conduct by the police
caused him to plead guilty at trial. The court held that the petition was properly dis-
missed. The court advanced the following reasoning to support its decision:
If either a confession or a plea of guilty is caused by illegal and coercive
conduct on the part of law-enforcement officials, the conviction cannot stand ....
But the issue here is whether the pleas are attributable to the conduct in ques-
tion. If it is reasonably found that there is no relationship of cause and effect,
the fact that illegal acts were committed in order to extract information or
confessions from the accused does not warrant setting aside the conviction.
In the case at bar the finding that the pleas were not the product of any illegal
conduct of law-enforcement officials is amply supported by the evidence. The
pleas of guilty were not made until more than a month after the occurrence of
the acts complained of; and petitioner must be deemed to be aware, through
his counsel, that any evidence obtained by unlawful methods could not have
been used against him. It is clear that the antecedent conduct of police and
State's Attorney, however much it is to be condemned, had no substantial con-
nection with the pleas of guilty.
People v. Heirens, supra at 141-42, 122 NE.2d at 237. (Citations omitted.)
The above reasoning is more convincing in its attempt to demonstrate that there must
be a substantial connection between the denial and the proceeding in which the petitioner
was convicted than in the application of the requirement.
81 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965) employs the phrase, "such a
denial" which is enhanced by the phrase, "void or voidable." Both taken together would
be comparable to the Illinois term, "substantial."
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forded when the petitioner has been prejudiced by the denial of his
constitutional rights. The determination of prejudice or substantiality
can only be made after a hearing by the court on the merits of the
petition. During the hearing, evidence should be presented both to
support a finding that there was a denial, which is required by the
statute, and to establish that the denial was prejudicial.
While the previous discussion introduces a procedural technique
which may be used in the ultimate disposition of a post-conviction
petition, its use in analyzing these petitions is not singular. Because
many of the considerations which must be made in considering the
petition on its merits must also be made in ruling on a motion to dis-
miss, this approach has concurrent application in considering the
initial motion to dismiss the petition. 2 If, for instance, the petition does
not allege a constitutional right, because either the right is not guar-
anteed by a constitutional provision or the right is not clearly set
forth in the petition, it would be proper for the hearing court to dismiss
the petition. The propriety of dismissal under these circumstances is
based on the assumption that a hearing on the issues of denial and
substantiality would be a wasted exercise if in the final analysis no
right existed which could be substantially denied. Again a petition
which sets forth no denial of a constitutional right should similarly be
dismissed. Yet some petitions set forth a denial in the vaguest of lan-
guage which might be made clearer if a hearing on the merits were
held. Clearly, dismissal in such a situation would not serve the ob-
jectives of the statute. To resolve the problems involved in these
vaguely stated petitions, the Illinois courts have adopted the following
test to guide them in their decision: a petition should not be dismissed
on motion wherein the alleged facts liberally construed in favor of the
petitioner and assumed to be true show that there has been a denial
of petitioner's constitutional rights. 3 Yet, it is important to note that
this rule will save vaguely alleged denials from a motion to dismiss, but
it will not be of assistance to a petitioner who does not clearly identify
32 In Illinois, the State's attorney must move to dismiss the petition on the ground
that it is insufficient to invoke the remedy provided by the statute. This motion is made
either because the petition is believed to be insufficient or because the State's attorney
needs more time in which to answer a sufficient petition. In either case the trial court
must make a preliminary determination as to the sufficiency of the petition only when
so moved by the State's attorney.
In Ohio the trial court must determine the question of the petition's sufficiency
before it may ask the prosecuting attorney to answer. The result under either statute
is that the trial court will determine if the petition is sufficient to invoke the remedy
provided by the statute. See discussion in note 10 supra.
33 People v. Jennings, supra note 8, at 26, 102 N.E.2d at 827.
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the constitutional right on which he depends. Lastly where the post-
conviction petition does not state the fact of substantiality clearly,
the motion to dismiss should be overruled in order to permit the peti-
tioner to offer evidence on the issue.
The actual application of this approach for the adjudication of
post-conviction petitions and ruling on motions to dismiss might be
presented in a discussion of how the Illinois courts have disposed of
different petitions. By examining the results of the Illinois courts, the
Ohio courts will be better able to judge which Ohio petitions are en-
titled to relief. The cases involving incompetency of counsel and co-
erced confessions require separate treatment because of their frequent
appearance and because they present a more complete experience with
certain substantive rights. Yet other rights which occasionally form
the basis of post-conviction petitions are worthy of note in order to
indicate the scope of the remedy provided by the statute.
1. Incompetency of Counsel
Post-conviction petitions which have been filed under the Illinois
statute are often based on the allegation that petitioner's counsel
was incompetent. Petitions alleging lack of counsel are infrequent be-
cause the Illinois Constitution guarantees the criminal defendant
assistance of counsel 4 and the statutes provide for appointed counsel
in those instances in which the defendant is unable to afford counsel. 5
Thus the focus of appellate concern in Illinois has been the question
of incompetency of counsel, and in response the Illinois Supreme
Court has attempted to guide the lower courts in their disposition of
these particular post-conviction petitions.
A petition alleging inadequacy of counsel is based on a constitu-
tional right, the right to have effective assistance of counsel. With
the petition based on a constitutional right there must have been a
substantial denial of that right in order for the petitioner to be entitled
to relief. The determination of substantial denial is qualitative and not
84 11. Const. art. I, § 9 (1870).
85 11. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.26(2) (Smith-Hurd 1956), which pre-dates the post-
conviction statute, provides:
In all criminal cases wherein the accused upon conviction shall, or may,
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, if, at the time of his arraign-
ment he is not represented by counsel, the court shall before receiving, entering
or allowing the change of any plea to an indictment or to an information if
indictment has been waived, advise him he has a right to be defended by coun-
sel. If he desires counsel, and states under oath he is unable to employ counsel,
the court shall appoint competent counsel to represent him.
The same guarantees are present in Ohio, but allegations of lack of counsel are common.
Ohio Const. art. I, § 10; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.50 (Page 1953).
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quantitative because the petitioner, by alleging incompetency of counsel,
admits the existence of counsel. The qualitative aspect of the determi-
nation is resolved by deciding whether or not the petitioner's right to
due process was prejudiced by the incompetency of his counsel. It is
a question of whether the counsel which was chosen by petitioner or
appointed for him was so incompetent so as to prejudice the petitioner
in his right to have effective assistance of counsel.
The Illinois courts have attempted to dispose of these particular
cases by presuming that petitioner's counsel was competent. This re-
buttable presumption of competency has been relied on more strongly
in the cases in which counsel was chosen than in the appointed counsel
cases. The reason for this varying degree of reliance between chosen
and appointed counsel cases is found in the underlying reasons and
policies supporting it. While much of its support is found in bits and
pieces throughout the opinions dealing with competency of counsel,
a complete statement of the presumption is presented in the early
case of People v. Reeves,36 in which the court adopted the statement
of Justice Minton:"
Whenever the court in good faith appoints or accepts the appearance
of a member of the bar in good standing to represent a defendant,
the presumption is that such counsel is competent. Otherwise, he
would not be in good standing at the bar and accepted by the court.
The constitutional requirements have been met as to the necessity
for counsel. If the action of counsel in the presence of the court in
the conduct of the trial reduces the trial to a travesty on justice,
such conduct might be considered on the proposition that such a
trial was a denial of due process.... Petitions challenging the com-
petency of counsel, especially years after the conviction, must
clearly allege such a factual situation which if established by com-
petent evidence would show the representation of counsel was such
as to reduce the trial to a farce or a sham. Otherwise they should
be dismissed.38
In the case in which the petitioner has alleged that the counsel
which he chose was incompetent, the courts have relied on the fore-
going to dismiss the petition. The reason is that the Illinois Supreme
Court has held, based on this presumption, that petitions alleging in-
competency of chosen counsel do not set forth the required denial of a
36 412 Ill. 555, 562-63, 107 N.E.2d 861, 865 (1952).
37 In the case of United States v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948), the court
of appeals reversed the district court's order to discharge the petitioner, Feeley. He had
been discharged on the ground that his appointed counsel was not competent. Mr. Justice
Minton stated the presumption of competency as the court's underlying reason supporting
his reversal.
38 Id. at 978-81.
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constitutional right. 9 Thus it is proper for the trial court to dismiss
the petition on motion without affording petitioner a hearing on the
merits. The reason is that the petitioner has not alleged a denial, and
as noted above, a petition which does not allege a denial is sus-
ceptible to a motion to dismiss. Yet a further practical reason prompts
the summary treatment of these petitions and the unbending reliance
on the presumption of competency:
Ordinarily, a defendant who retains counsel of his own selection
is responsible if that counsel does not faithfully serve his interest.
Any other rule would put a premium upon pretended incompetence
of counsel; for, if the rule were otherwise, a lawyer with a desperate
case would have only to neglect it in order to insure reversal or
vacation of the conviction. 40
The allegation of incompetency of appointed counsel is treated
entirely differently from the automatic treatment accorded petitions
involving chosen counsel. Petitions alleging lack of counsel 14 or in-
competency of appointed counsel require a full hearing on the merits
by the trial court.42 The hearing is required in order to permit the peti-
tioner to present evidence that he has been substantially prejudiced
by the incompetency of his attorney. Here the sustaining of a motion
to dismiss would be improper, and the rebuttable quality of the pre-
sumption of competency comes into full force in order to allow the
petitioner an opportunity to demonstrate to the hearing court that
there was an inadequacy of representation which reduced the trial as
39 People v. Nischt, 23 Ill. 2d 284, 288, 178 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1961); People v.
Kirkwood, supra note 19; Davies v. People, 10 Ill. 2d 11, 15, 139 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1956) ;
People v. Heirens, supra note 30, at 143, 122 N.E.2d at 238; People v. Vitale, 3 Ill. 2d
99, 105, 119 N.E.2d 784, 787 (1954); People v. Mlitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285
(1952).
40 People v. Mitchell, supra note 39, at 407-08, 104 N.E.2d at 285.
41 In People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957), the post-conviction peti-
tion alleged lack of counsel. Petitioner, who was fourteen at the time of his trial for
murder, was defended quite well by one Simmons. Simmons, who had solicited peti-
tioner's mother for the opportunity to defend her son, was not a licensed attorney. The
trial court dismissed the petition, but on appeal it was reversed. The court reaffirmed
its holding on the presumption of competency, but reasoned that it was not fundamen-
tally fair that the petitioner should be defended by one whose right and qualifications
are clouded with doubt. Compare People v. Evans, 4 Ill. 2d 211, 122 N.E.2d 730 (1954),
in which the court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the post-conviction petition
in which it was alleged that the petitioner did not have assistance of counsel and was
not permitted to consult with counsel or his family before the trial.
42 People v. Thomas, 20 IlI. 2d 603, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960); People v. Hall, 413
MI1. 615, 110 N.E.2d 249 (1953). In each case the post-conviction petition alleged that
appointed counsel was incompetent, but each petitioner failed to sustain the burden of
proving that counsel was incompetent.
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conducted to a sham and farce. 3 Both the court and Mr. Justice
Minton would require the petitioner to meet the sham and farce test
in order to rebut the presumption of competency. Yet the sham and
farce standard is shrouded in a most inappropriate choice of words as
they imply theatrical insinuations and intentional debauchery. Rather
a more objective and logical test is preferred:
However, based both on precedent and reason, we believe that
in order to sustain his position here [that his appointed counsel was
incompetent] the defendant must clearly establish: (1) actual in-
competency of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out
his duties as a trial attorney; and (2) substantial prejudice resulting
therefrom, without which the outcome would probably have been
different. Due to the nature of the inquiry it is hardly possible to
be more definite, and each case will have to be judged on its own
particular facts as they appear in the context of the proceeding
under consideration.44
2. Coerced Confessions
Petitions, which allege the introduction into evidence of a coerced
confession in the proceeding which resulted in the petitioner's convic-
tion, present another illustration of how the Illinois courts determine
if a petition is entitled to relief. Because such a petition alleges the
denial of a constitutional right, the trial court may not sustain a
motion to dismiss the petition but must afford the petitioner a full
hearing on the merits 5 The underlying principle for the requirement
of a full hearing is that:
A voluntary confession by a competent person of the guilt of a crime
is the highest type of evidence-an involuntary confession obtained
43 See People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954); People v. Reeves,
supra note 36, at 563-64, 107 N.E.2d at 865-66. In People v. Morris, supra, the court
held that the attorney's conduct did not measure up to that expected of a competent
and conscientious trial attorney. The attorney, who was a Cook County public defender,
was meager in preparation and scant in attention to the defense. The court ordered a
new trial for the petitioner.
44 People v. Morris, supra note 43, at 449, 121 N.E2d at 817.
45 People v. Walden, 19 Il1. 2d 602, 603, 169 N.E.2d 241 (1960); People v. La Frana,
4 I1. 2d 261, 262, 122 N.E.2d 583, 584 (1954). In the case of People v. La Frana, supra,
the petitioner alleged in his post-conviction petition that his confession to murder and
to two robberies had been coerced. The trial court dismissed the petition on motion of
the State's attorney. The Illinois Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for a writ
of error. But the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for further proceedings. Jennings v. Illinois, 342
U.S. 104, 111 (1951). The Illinois Supreme Court then remanded the petitioner's cause
to the trial court for a hearing on the merits, People v. Jennings, supra note 8, at 27,
102 N.E.2d at 828.
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by brutality or coercion is wholly unreliable and is the most flagrant
violation of the principles of freedom and justice.46
While the court is insistent that each petition alleging the use of
a coerced confession as evidence must be given a hearing, the success
of petitioners at the hearing has not been encouraging. Perhaps the
recent case of Escobedo v. Illinois47 will change the grimness of this
picture in Illinois. The problem has resulted from the difficulty in
finding that there was in fact a coerced confession. The petitioner's
testimony usually concerns the brutality used in extracting the con-
fession; this testimony is generally contradicted by the officers in-
volved who deny everything. Petitioner's assertions without supporting
evidence have meant failure in sustaining his claim, and the lower
court's finding has been affirmed as a matter of course on appeal 4 8
But the fact of coerced confession has been held to be established when
the petitioner presents evidence which tends to support his allegation
of coercion and the State's attorney does not present sufficient re-
buttal evidence4
46 People v. Hall, supra note 42, at 624, 110 N.E.2d at 254.
47 378 U.S. 478 (1964). But the Ilinois Supreme Court has construed the holding
of the case as limited in its effect to the facts of the case. See People v. Kees, 32 Ill. 2d
299, 205 N.E.2d 729 (1965); People v. Hartgraves, 31 III. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
The court has rejected the wider rule that a confession may not be received in evidence
if made by an accused without counsel or unless the right to counsel has been intelligently
waived. People v. Kees, supra; People v. Hartgraves, supra. For a discussion of the
Escobedo case, see Herman, "The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interroga-
tions," 25 Ohio St. L.J. 449, 471-81 (1964).
48 See, e.g., People v. Nischt, supra note 39; People v. Walden, supra note 45;
Jackson v. People, 16 Ill. 2d 526, 158 N.E.2d 589 (1959); Davies v. People, supra note
39; Reck v. People, 7 IM. 2d 261, 130 N.E.2d 200 (1955). The court's usual reasoning,
which is applied in affirming the determination of the lower court, is as follows: "The
defendant was ably represented both at his trial and upon the post-conviction hearing.
We have carefully examined all of the testimony and we find no reason to set aside the
determinations of those who saw the witnesses and heard them testify." People v. Walden,
supra at 608, 169 N.-2d at 244.
49 People v. La Frana, supra note 45. In the hearing by the post-conviction court,
petitioner presented evidence that his wife and attorney saw him shortly after he signed
the confession. They testified that La Frana's face was swollen. The police stated that
La Frana had fallen down the stairs in an attempt to escape. While many reporters were
at the foot of the stairs, the newspapers carried no reports about the attempted escape.
The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
on the grounds that the State's attorney did not meet the burden placed on him by the
petitioner's evidence. Petitioner for example testified that he was illegally detained by
the police for a week after the confession was signed in order to afford an opportunitya
for the wounds to heal.
While La Frana's conviction was reversed, his codefendant, Davies, did not succeed
with his post-conviction petition. Davies v. People, supra note 39. Even though La Frana
testified that he saw the petitioner, Davies, struck by police officers, the post-conviction
court found that the confession was not coerced, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
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From the foregoing it can be seen that the suggested technique,
when used with case law relevant to the issues, presents a clearer ap-
proach to the disposition of post-conviction petitions. Where a con-
stitutional right was not involved, as in the allegation of a procedural
error, the court was not required to continue its fact finding process
and allowed a dismissal. Again where a constitutional right was alleged
but a denial was not shown, as in the case of incompetency of chosen
counsel, the court made no further determinations and simply dis-
missed on motion. Lastly, where a denial of constitutional right was
alleged, as in the cases of incompetency of appointed counsel and
coerced confessions, the court was not permitted to dismiss on motion,
but was required to determine the issues during a hearing on the merits.
This same approach is applicable to the disposition of petitions which
allege denial of other constitutional rights.
3. Additional Constitutional Rights
While the usual allegations found in Illinois post-conviction peti-
tions concern either incompetency of counsel or the use of a coerced
confession, there are other constitutional rights which, once the denial
is established, are sufficient to authorize remedial action under the
Illinois statute. For example, allegations in a post-conviction petition
asserting illegal arrest" or the use of evidence obtained through an
illegal search and seizure should be sufficient to entitle the petition to
relief. However, few Illinois cases report the use of these fourth
amendment rights as a basis for post-conviction relief. Again several
petitions contain allegations stating that petitioner was denied the
constitutional right to a speedy trial,"' but the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that that right is violated only when the delay is arbitrary
and oppressive.2 This requirement insures that the delay complained
Co See Miller v. People, 23 III. 2d 420, 424, 178 N.E.2d 355, 357-58 (1961), cert. denied,
369 US. 826 (1962), in which the petitioner alleged in his post-conviction petition that
the purported warrant for his arrest was illegal because a deputy sheriff, who had just
resigned as a justice of the peace, signed the warrant without authority. Petitioner alleged
that the illegality of the warrant rendered his voluntary confession illegal. The court
held that the allegation was insufficient to afford a basis for any relief since an arrest
without a warrant would have been legal as there was sufficient probable cause.
51 11. Const. art. 2, § 9 (1870). See also Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1964) which provides: "Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense
shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was
taken into custody . .. ."
52 See People v. Farley, supra note 13, at 293, 96 N.E.2d at 456; People v. Hartman,
supra note 14, at 136-37, 96 N.E.2d at 451. In each case the fact that the petitioner asked
for and obtained a continuante beyond the 120 day period was controlling. See also
People v. Allen, 15 Ill. 2d 455, 457, 155 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1959) (delay occasioned by
conviction for malicious mischief as a prisoner); People v. Morris, supra note 43, at
442-43, 121 N.E.2d at 814.
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of is truly prejudicial to the petitioner's right of due process. When
sufficiently alleged,. however, so as to survive a motion to dismiss, the
petition is usually subject to eventual dismissal because of the doctrine
of waiver.53
In several petitions it has been alleged that the prosecutor
through his actions has deprived the petitioner of due procesg in the
conduct of the trial. For instance, one post-conviction trial court set
aside the conviction of the petitioner who claimed that his plea of
guilty was induced by the prosecutor's promise to recommend leniency;
the conviction was set aside because the promise was not executed even
though it would not have been binding on the court in rendering its
judgment and sentence.54 Again the dicta in several opinions indicate
that a petition alleging that the prosecutor suppressed evidence is
sufficient to invoke the statute; but in each of the reported cases the
court held that the facts failed to support a finding that there was
a suppression.55 The right to be tried by an impartial jury is another
constitutional right,58 which if the deprivation of it is proved, the post-
conviction court must set aside the conviction. The Illinois Supreme
Court has ruled that a jury is not impartial after its members have
read incurably inflammatory newspaper reports57 or have just served
in another case which was similar to the one in question.58 Lastly the
prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony is sufficient to invoke the
remedial qualities of the statute.59
The constitutional rights just discussed are those which have been
reported to have been a basis for a petition seeking relief under the
statute. Undoubtedly many more well-recognized constitutional rights
52 See text accompanying note 62 infra. See also the discussion of waiver and the
right to a speedy trial in People v. Morris, supra note 43, at 442-43, 121 N.E.2d at 814.
54 McKeag v. People, 7 Ill. 2d 586, 588, 131 NYE.2d 517, 518 (1956).
55 People v. Turner, 29 IEI. 2d 379, 382-83, 194 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1963); People v.
Nischt, supra note 39, at 292-93, 178 N.E.2d at 383 (petitioner's attorney was informed
but not petitioner); Merkie v. People, 15 I1. 2d 539, 545, 155 NXE.2d 581, 584 (1959).
50 Ill. Const. art. 2, § 9 (1870).
57 People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 184-86, 125 N.E.2d 61, 66 (1955). The petitioner
was granted a new trial because the jurors had read in the paper the night before they
were to render a verdict that the petitioner had confessed to two murders, boasted that
he had criminally attacked more than fifty women, and that he was described by the
police as a "vicious degenerate." Compare Ciucci v. People, 21 I1. 2d 81, 171 N.E.2d 34
(1961) (petitioner held to have waived the issue).
58 People v. Adams, supra note 17.
59 Napue v. People, 13 Ill. 2d 566, 569, 150 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1958). While the court
stated that the ground was sufficient, it upheld the lower court's finding against the
petition because the jury was sufficiently appraised of the witness' interest in testifying
falsely. In this case the dissent presents a better appreciation of the petitioner's allegation.
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have been employed as a basis, but the petitions in which they were
raised were successfully disposed of at the trial level. The exhaustion
of the reported cases necessarily ends the assistance which Ohio judges
and lawyers can attain from the Illinois experience. Further and more
basic assistance is found in those federal and Ohio cases which have
discussed constitutional rights in order to determine which rights, if
deprived, would render void or voidable the petitioner's conviction.
III. WAIVR AND RES JUDICATA
Once the post-conviction court has determined that the petitioner
may be entitled to relief, the next step is to decide if the issues raised
in the petition are barred by the application of either waiver or res
judicata.60 This step precedes a hearing on the merits only when the
State's attorney's answer asserts that the issues have been waived
or have been previously adjudicated. The reason is that both waiver
and res judicata are affirmative defenses. 'When either defense is raised
by the answer, its merit is properly determined during a post-conviction
hearing; 6 the petitioner must have an opportunity to respond to the
State's assertion that he is barred from raising his issues under the
statute.
A. Waiver
An alleged denial of constitutional rights may be found by the
post-conviction hearing court to have been waived by the petitioner if
he has had a fair opportunity to assert these claims in a previous pro-
ceeding but has forfeited these claims by his failure to make a timely
assertion.62 Yet, because "waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,"63 the courts have
not found waiver where the petitioner was prevented from asserting
his constitutional rights because of either inculpable ignorance or other
extrinsic factors. Within this legal framework the Illinois decisions
60 See People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 27, 102 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1952).
61 After the post-conviction court overrules the State attorney's motion to dismiss,
the State's attorney must then answer the petition. In the answer it is appropriate to
allege that the issues in the petition are barred by the doctrines of waiver or res judicata
if those defenses are indicated by the facts. When either of these defenses is raised by
the answer, the trial judge must determine at the commencement of the post-conviction
hearing if the defense bars a further hearing on the issues. If either doctrine is properly
raised and is applicable, then the court will proceed no further and dismiss the petition.
If not barred, the court will rule against the defenses and then proceed to hear the merits
of petitioner's allegations.
62 People v. Jennings, supra note 60, at 25, 102 N.E.2d at 826.
63 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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dealing with waiver have indicated that there are three factual situa-
tions in which the post-conviction issues have been found to have been
waived.
The trial court is the earliest situation in which the petitioner
can effectively waive his claims of a denial of constitutional rights
through his failure to assert them. But in order for the post-conviction
court to find effective waiver at the trial level, the State's attorney
must establish that the petitioner was represented by either counsel
of his own choosing or by competent court appointed counsel, and also
that there was sufficient opportunity to assert the denial of constitu-
tional rights during the proceeding.6 4 For example, where petitioner,
who was represented by counsel, was acquitted by the jury under the
first indictment and then later found guilty by the same jury under a
similar and subsequent indictment, failure of the petitioner or his
counsel to raise the objection that the same jury is sitting on the
second indictment would waive the error. It is the affirmative duty of
counsel to place the claims before the original court, or they are waived
and are not justiciable before the post-conviction court.63
Another situation of waiver arises where the petitioner has prose-
cuted an appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction through
means of a writ of error with an attached bill of exceptions. In this
situation constitutional issues not raised on appeal are waived and,
subsequently, are not justiciable under the post-conviction statute.66
Some hearing courts have confused the reasons for not deciding the
issues raised under the statute in this situation. In some cases petitions,
alleging issues which have been waived, have been dismissed on the
ground of res judicata when the reason should have properly been
waiver. But the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the reason ad-
vanced in this situation is of no import so long as the dismissal is
proper under one of the grounds. The court stated:
64 People v. Milligan, 28 Ill. 2d 203, 204, 190 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1963); People v.
Jennings, supra note 60, at 26-27, 102 N.E.2d at 827.
65 People v. Milligan, supra note 64, at 205, 190 N.E.2d at 755 (failure to raise
affirmative defense of insanity at trial) ; People v. Allen, supra note 52 (claim of denial
of speedy trial not raised at trial); People v. Adams, supra note 17, at 457-58, 123 NX..2d
at 330 (failed to place objection of jury before trial court) ; People v. Clark, 405 I11. 483,
486, 91 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1950) (waiver of right to copy of indictment and right to jury
trial).
66 People v. Hamby, 32 III. 2d 291, 294, 205 NXE.2d 456, 458 (1965); Ciucci v.
People, supra note 57, at 85, 171 N.E.2d at 36-37; People v. Johnson, 15 MI1. 2d 244, 254,
154 N.E.2d 274, 280 (1958); People v. Kirkrand, 14 Ill. 2d 86, 89, 150 N.E.2d 788, 789
(1958); People v. Dolgin, 6 Il1. 2d 109, 111, 126 N.E.2d 681, 682 (1955).
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Whether a decision on a writ of error be res judicata or whether the
defendant be considered to have waived any claims he could have
made is immaterial, because it is clear that, having once obtained
a review by a writ of error on a bill of exceptions, a defendant can-
not thereafter assert any claims which he could have made on that
writ of error.67
While in a particular case the State's attorney may present facts
which on their face should bar the petitioner's action because of waiver,
the courts have held that under some circumstances extrinsic facts
may compel an exception to the usual application of the doctrine of
waiver. 8 The reason for an exception to the usual application of
waiver in this situation has been stated as follows:
We consider the waiver principle a salutary one, conducive to the
effective enforcement of the rules which society has established for
its protection, but we have not hesitated to relax its application
where fundamental fairness so requires.69
A third situation in which the doctrine of waiver has been found
is where the petitioner has previously filed a petition for relief under
the post-conviction statute; in that situation any constitutional claims
which were not asserted are waived." While the statute requires
67 Ciucci v. People, supra note 57, at 85, 171 N.E.2d at 36-37.
68 In People v. Hamby, supra note 66, the petitioner received a review of his con-
viction for armed robbery even though he moved the court to refuse review. Petitioner's
appointed counsel alleged grounds for reversal which the petitioner considered to be
without merit. As counsel would not allege on appeal the grounds which petitioner
wanted, petitioner requested that the Illinois Supreme Court strike his appointed counsel's
abstract and briefs from the file and to appoint other counsel for him. The court over-
ruled the motion, and then proceeded to find that the grounds advanced by appointed
counsel were without merit. Petitioner next proceeded to file a petition under the post-
conviction statute in which he alleged alternate grounds from those asserted on the
previous appeal. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because of the failure
to raise the grounds on the previous appeal. The petitioner appealed once more, and the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court's finding because it could not fairly be
said that petitioner waived the issues.
See also People v. Kirkrand, supra note 66, in which petitioner alleged that his
indigency prevented him from obtaining a transcript of the testimony which was neces-
sary in order to raise certain issues. The court held that only those issues that could
have been raised on the common law record are waived. The usefulness of this particular
defense to waiver has been diminished since Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and
the enactment of Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 101.65-1 (Smith-Hurd 1956) (provision for
free transcripts for indigent defendants).
69 People v. Hamby, supra note 66, at 294, 205 N.E.2d at 458.
70 People v. Chapman, - Ill. 2d -, 211 N.E.2d 712, 713 (1965); People v. Orr,
10 III. 2d 95, 100, 139 N.E.2d 212, 215 (1957) (dictum); see also People v. Lewis, 2
Ill. 2d 328, 331, 118 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1954).
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the doctrine of waiver to be applied in this situation,' there is also a
statutory policy that a petitioner who seeks to take advantage of the
post-conviction remedy must set forth in his petition for relief all the
constitutional claims which he feels have been denied. 2 It is arguable
that waiver would not be applied to those claims unknown to the
petitioner because of inculpable ignorance at the time but no cases
supporting this proposition have been found.
While any one of the foregoing factual situations presents an
instance in which the doctrine of waiver could be successfully asserted,
a determination that the issues have been waived at the state court
level does not prevent a petitioner from raising the issues at the federal
level.73 While the petitioner may assert these issues in a federal court
proceeding, the state is still allowed the opportunity to establish the
fact of waiver.74 Even if the state is successful in establishing the fact
that the petitioner has waived the issues at the state court level, this
does not automatically bar relief in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. 75 "Nor does a state court's finding of waiver bar independent
determination of the question by the federal courts on habeas corpus,
for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question .... 2,76
Henry v. Mississippi7 seems to provide an exception to the gen-
eral rule that the federal courts may independently determine the
question of waiver. The court said that:
If either reason [for not objecting to the introduction of testimony]
motivated the action of petitioner's counsel, and their plans back-
fired, counsel's deliberate choice of the strategy would amount to a
waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a deci-
sion on the merits of his federal claim either in the state courts or
here.78
This last statement reinforces the Illinois Supreme Court's require-
ment that waiver may be found only where the petitioner was repre-
sented by counsel and where he had an opportunity to assert his claims.
71 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "Any claim of sub-
stantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended petition is
waived."
72 People v. Lewis, supra note 70.
73 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
74 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965).
75 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
76 Ibid. For an analysis of federal waiver doctrines, see Comment, 27 Ohio St. LJ.
321, 322 (1966).
77 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
78 Henry v. Mississippi, supra note 77, at 451.
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B. Res Judicata
As in the case of waiver, the doctrine of res judicata may be
effectively asserted by the State's attorney to prevent further adjudica-
tion of the post-conviction petition. Res judicata under both the Ohio79
and the Illinois80 laws applies to not only those issues which were
adjudicated but also to those issues which might have been adjudicated
in the previous proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court has made it
clear that the remedy provided by the post-conviction statute may
not prevail where the issues are res judicata when it said: "The remedy
provided for under the act cannot be employed to obtain another
hearing upon claims of denial of constitutional rights as to which a
full and final hearing on the merits has already been had."'
s
While the doctrine of res judicata must be accorded due consid-
eration within the post-conviction remedy, its use cannot be an auto-
matic barrier to an investigation of the alleged denials of constitutional
rights if the purpose of the statute is to be served.82 The court has
ruled that the doctrine of res judicata must not be mechanically ap-
plied in a post-conviction case except where the identical issues which
are raised in the post-conviction petition have received a full and
final hearing on the merits by the Illinois Supreme Court. The court
has stated:
JI]t is clear that res judkata cannot be mechanically applied to
foreclose an inquiry which probes beneath the mere fact of adjudi-
cation to determine whether or not, in process of adjudication, there
has been any infringement of the constitutional rights of the peti-
tioner. Such an inquiry must be made even though it involves a
collateral attack upon a judgment which the court has jurisdiction
and authority to enter. Of course ... constitutional issues which
have been determined on the merits by this court are not available
upon a post-conviction hearing. 3
Any proceeding, which is free from constitutional defect itself and
in which the alleged claims have been adjudicated against the peti-
tioner, may serve as the basis for the assertion of the doctrine of res
judicata in a proceeding under the post-conviction statute. A review
79 Pollock v. Cohen, 32 Ohio St. 514, 519-20 (1877).
80 People v. Thompson, 392 M. 589, 591, 65 N.E.2d 362, 363 (1946).
81 People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 244, 92 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1950).
82 People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 617, 114 N.E.2d 706, 710 (1953).
83 People v. Jennings, supra note 60, at 25, 102 N.E.2d at 826. See also People v.
Evans, supra note 41, at 212, 122 N.E.2d at 730; People v. Reeves, supra note 36, at
559, 107 N.E.2d at 864; People v. Manning, 412 IN. 519, 522, 107 N.E.2d 856, 857 (1952).
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or denial of a petition for writ of error by the Illinois Supreme Court
is res judicata as to all assigned errors.8" Also the allegations con-
tained in an earlier petition for habeas corpus will be res judicata
on a later post-conviction petition unless newly discovered evidence
is presented. 5 Lastly, it would also seem that a previous denial on the
merits of relief by means of a writ of error coram nobis would be res
judicata on the same issues in a post-conviction petition. 6
In many cases, the original trial court has ruled on the very
issues which are later presented to the post-conviction court. For
example, petitioner may have objected to the introduction into evi-
dence of a confession on the grounds that it was coerced. Suppose
further that the trial judge heard argument on the issue and determined
that the confession was not coerced. Should the trial judge's deter-
mination that the confession was not coerced be held res judicata on
that issue in the post-conviction court? The appellate courts have said
that "due weight should be accorded that determination" 7 where the
issues have been fairly asserted and litigated. But surely the due
weight requirement does not mean a complete foreclosure on the post-
conviction court to determine the merits because to do so would be
to reintroduce the mechanical application of res judicata which the
court has condemned. Yet the opposite result would attain if the
previous determination had been made by a post-conviction court and
petitioner seeks to raise the issue of a coerced confession in a second
post-conviction court. In that case, the application of res judicata would
be justified.8"
84 Ciucd v. People, supra note 57, at 85, 171 N.E.2d at 36; People v. Johnson, supra
note 66, at 254-55, 154 N.E.2d at 280; People v. Dolgin, supra note 66, at 111, 126 N.E.2d
at 682; People v. Davis, 415 I1. 234, 236, 112 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1953).
85 People v. Evans, supra note 41, at 212, 122 N.E.2d at 730 (dictum); People v.
Pring, 414 Ill. 63, 65, 110 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1953).
86 People v. Manning, supra note 83, at 521-22, 107 N.E.2d at 857 (dictum).
87 People v. Jennings, supra note 60, at 25, 102 N.E.2d at 826.
88 For illustrative cases in which petitioner received a full post-conviction hearing
on the merits of the issue alleged in the post-conviction petition, even though the original
trial court decided against the petitioner on the exact issues, see People v. Byrd, 21 Ill. 2d
114, 171 N.E.2d 782 (1961) (issue of coerced confession); Davies v. People, supra note
39 (issue of coerced confession); Reck v. People, supra note 48 (issue of coercion pre-
sented to two judges and one jury); People v. La Frana, 4 Ill. 2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583
(1954) (indigence prevented review of trial court); People v. Wakat, supra note 82
(newly discovered evidence).
89 People v. Dampher, 28 I1. 2d 136, 190 N.E.2d at 705 (1963); People v. Byrd,
supra note 88, at 115, 171 N.E.2d at 783.
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IV. PROCEDURE OF FiNAL DISPOSITION
Once the post-conviction court determines that the petitioner may
be entitled to relief and that waiver and res judicata do not bar further
proceedings, the court affords the petitioner a hearing on the merits.
The procedures which are followed in the post-conviction hearing and
in further appeal are the concern of this section. In Ohio and Illinois,
the procedure used in adjudicating the constitutional issues raised by
the petition is an overlapping of statutory guidelines and judicial
discretion. Both the Ohio and Illinois statutes" are scant in their
specificity of the procedures to be followed by the post-conviction
court. Each statute mentions that the petitioner's presence may be
ordered, that evidence may be introduced and that judgment and
further orders concerning the petitioner must be made.91 Beside this
listing of procedures which may be followed, the statutes are without
additional guidance. Thus it is the post-conviction court, itself, that
is given the responsibility for overseeing the procedure during a hear-
ing. The trial judge is given discretion as to whether the petitioner
will be present during the hearing, the kinds of evidence and the
manner in which it is to be presented, and the final disposition of the
petitioner and his petition.92 The trial judge's discretion over pro-
cedural matters is reviewable upon appeal,9" but it is the position of
the Illinois Supreme Court to reverse only if the exercise of his dis-
cretion was clearly erroneous.94
A. Presence of Petitioner
Under the Ohio and Illinois statutes,95 it is the hearing judge
who must require that the petitioner be brought before the court so
that he may be present during the hearing. The petitioner is not
vested with an inherent right to be present during the hearing.96 Even
90 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, art. 122 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1965).
91 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.22
(Page Supp. 1965).
92 Jenner, "The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act," 9 F.RD. 347, 361 (1950).
93 Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.23
(Page Supp. 1965).
94 See infra note 135.
95 I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "In its discretion the
court may order the petitioner brought before the court for the hearing." Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2953.22 (Page Supp. 1965) provides: "A court may entertain and determine
a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised Code without requiring the
production of the prisoner, whether or not a hearing is held"
96 People v. Cummins, 414 Ill. 308, 310, 111 N.E.2d 307, 309 (1953).
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his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum depends on
the discretion of the post-conviction trial judge for its success.
The policy behind this reservation is that the petitioner should
only be transported from the state penitentiary to the county in which
he was convicted when his presence is necessary.9 The policy dis-
favors free trips 9 and encourages that utility be promoted by the peti-
tioner's presence in court. It is the duty of the trial judge to balance
the interests involved in deciding if there is sufficient utility to merit
the expense of transporting the petitioner. Because the petitioner's
interests are represented by counsel during the hearing,00 the court
will only order the petitioner's appearance if his testimony cannot be
presented to the court satisfactorily by another means. 01 The trial
judge's discretion in this matter is conclusive on appeal so long as it is
not arbitrary.0 2
B. Evidence During the Hearing
The manner in which the petitioner may present evidence during
the hearing to substantiate his allegations is again dependent on the
discretion of the hearing judge. A simple listing of the types of evidence
which may be used during the hearing is the extent of statutory
guidance given to the court. 0 3 It is the hearing judge who must deter-
97 People v. Adams, 4 Ill. 2d 453, 458, 123 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1954).
98 In People v. Cummins, supra note 96, petitioner on appeal contended that the
post-conviction court erred in not permitting him to appear at the hearing. The court
said that there was no error because "the record is barren of any request or of any
showing from which the court could determine that his presence was either a procedural
or substantive necessity."
99 Jenner, supra note 92, at 361 states: "It was believed that prisoners should not
be able to secure a free trip from the penitentiary merely by verifying a petition which
is good on its face." In Ohio the policy would seem even more attractive because veri-
fication is more simply accomplished in Ohio than in Illinois.
100 If the petitioner cannot afford an attorney to represent him at the post-
conviction proceedings, provisions are made in both statutes to appoint counsel: Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 122-4 (Sinith-Hurd 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.24 (Page Supp.
1965).
01 People v. Cummins, supra note 96; People v. Mitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 408, 104
N.E.2d 285 (1952). In People v. Cummins, supra, petitioner alleged on appeal that it
was unfair to receive the State's attorney's testimony at the post-conviction hearing during
which the petitioner was not permitted to appear. The court said that petitioner's asser-
tion overlooked the fact that the petitioner was represented by counsel who thoroughly
cross-examined the State's attorney, thus providing an opportunity for the court to
determine his credibility.
102 People v. Cummins, supfa note 96.
103 Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "The court may
receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence." See also Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.22 (Page Supp. 1965).
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mine what means of presenting evidence best promotes justice and
fairness in a given context." 4
The extent to which the hearing judge has been permitted to
exercise his discretion in evidentiary matters can be demonstrated by
the variety of means which have been sustained on appeal. For ex-
ample, the court may try the controverted issues of fact upon affidavits
in lieu of testimony during the hearing."0 5 The basis of the decision
affirming the use of this singular approach is that the affidavits filed
under the Illinois statute are expected to state and substantiate the
petitioner's claims as strongly as possible. 6 The hearing judge may
also receive evidence not heard at the original trial,0 7 as well as
determine the credibility of the evidence which was presented at the
trial. 08 Lastly, while it is proper for the hearing judge to read the
transcript of the evidence presented at the original trial, he is not
required to do so; and his refusal will not be prejudicial error. 0 9
C. Burden of Proof and Judgment
During the post-conviction hearing it is the petitioner who has
the burden of proving the truth of the allegations contained in his
petition.110 The petitioner has the burden because the statute has
directed that the procedural aspects be treated as if the proceeding
were a civil action."' To sustain his burden, the petitioner's proof
104 In People v. Wakat, supra note 82, at 616-17, 114 N.E.2d at 709, the court
stated: "The hearing on a post-conviction petition is a new and independent investiga-
tion, with the hearing court authorized and required to use any proper procedure neces-
sary and appropriate in order to discharge its duty of determining the existence or non-
existence of facts which would constitute a denial of a claimed constitutional right."
105 People v. Mitchell, supra note 101; People v. Dale, supra note 81, at 248, 92
N.E.2d at 766-67.
106 People v. Cummins, supra note 96, at 311, 111 NXE.2d at 309.
107 People v. Wakat, supra note 82, at 614-15, 114 N.E.2d at 708. The court not
only said that the post-conviction judges have the power to receive evidence not heard
at the original trial, but also they have an obligation to exercise the power.
108 People v. Alden, 15 Ill. 2d 498, 503, 155 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1959).
109 People v. Thomas, 20 Ill. 2d 603, 608, 170 N.E.2d 543, 545-46 (1960); People
v. Hall, 413 Ill. 615, 626, 110 N.E.2d 249, 255 (1953). In People v. Hall, supra, the court
ended its opinion by asking: "Is not this provision [IL. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-
Hurd 1964)] broad enough to permit petitioner to show, not only anything which might
appear in the transcript, but anything that might have occurred before, during or after
his trial?" It is arguable that this inquiry can be used to support a finding that the
petitioner should be able to impeach the evidence contained in the transcript. It follows
that if the provision allows petitioner to show what is in the transcript and to show
events not in the record, then where the transcript and other events are inconsistent with
each other, petitioner should be able to demonstrate this inconsistency to the court.
110 People v. Thomas, supra note 109, at 607, 170 N.E.2d at 545; People v. Alden,
supra note 108.
111 People v. Bernatowicz, 413 I1. 181, 184, 108 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1952).
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must clearly establish a deprivation, 2 or at a minimum it must make
a substantial showing of such a deprivation."' It is necessary to
sustain this burden before the State's attorney is required to present
evidence." 4 In cases in which petitioner's proof is successful, the
burden of proof shifts to the State which must then defend with its
evidence. 115
After the evidence has been presented for both sides, the post-
conviction court must thereafter render judgment. Both the Ohio and
Illinois statutes contemplate that the petition will be disposed of at
the trial level." 6 To dispose fully of the petition the court must decide
if the petitioner was successful and what further orders concerning
the petitioner should be made. If the petitioner's claims have not been
sustained, the petition will be dismissed and the petitioner will be
recommitted with or without resentencing. If the petitioner is success-
ful, the court's usual disposition will be to set aside the conviction and
order a new trial.ll In either event the court is given freedom in
shaping the final orders concerning the petitioner." 8
D. Appeal
The post-conviction hearing is an original proceeding, 119 which
is commenced at the trial level, and as such, review must necessarily.
112 See People v. Morris, 3 IlI. 2d 437, 449, 121 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1954).
113 See People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 560, 107 N.E.2d 861, 864 (1952), in which
the court said: "However we do not intend hereby to lessen the duty of petitioners under
the act to make a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights, for the
allegation of a mere conclusion to that effect under oath will not suffice."
114 People v. Hall, supra note 109, at 621, 110 N.E.2d at 252-53.
115 See, e.g., People v. La Frana, supra note 88, in which petitioner clearly estab-
lished during the post-conviction hearing that he received injuries while in police custody.
The State's attorney merely denied the charge, but the court in reversing petitioner's
conviction for murder said: "Under such circumstances the burden of establishing that
the injuries were not administered in order to obtain the confession, can be met only
by clear and convincing testimony as to the manner of their occurrence." People v.
La Frana, supra at 267, 122 N.E.2d at 586.
116 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "If the court finds
in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment
or sentence in the former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to rearraignment,
retrial, custody, bail or discharge as may be necessary and proper." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965) provides: "If the court finds . .. [for the petitioner] it
shall vacate and set aside the judgment, and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence
him or grant a new trial as may appear appropriate."
117 People v. Jennings, 411 11. 21, 27, 102 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1952).
118 1Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-6 (Smith-Hiurd 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21
(Page Supp. 1965).
119 In People v. Wakat, supra note 82, at 617-18, 114 N.E.2d at 710, the court
described the post-conviction proceeding as follows: "[Ojur decisions have made it clear
that a post-conviction proceeding is not an appeal or a limited review by an intermediate
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be made available to the petitioner in order to insure completeness of
the remedy. In accordance with this aim, provision is made in both
the Illinois and Ohio statutes for review of the lower court's judg-
ment.120 In Illinois appeals are taken to the Illinois Supreme Court
as an appeal is taken in "civil cases."'' The Illinois Supreme Court
has interpreted the statutory provision of appeal in such a way so as
to permit both the petitioner and the State to appeal as a matter of
right.122 The State's right to appeal, reasons the court, is based upon
the same considerations which permitted the, State to appeal in the
similar Illinois remedy of coram nobis. 23
While the court has given a liberal construction to the words "civil
cases" so that either party may seek review, the court has placed a
rather narrow and carefully defined interpretation on the statutory
words, "final judgment entered upon such petition," which are found in
the same section. 2 4 This narrow interpretation has limited the scope
of the court's review to only certain allegations in the petition upon
which the hearing court's judgment was based.125 The test as to
which allegations will be reviewed is found in the court's narrow
interpretation of the statutory words, "such petition."'1 26 The court
held in People v. Hartman,27 that the words, "such petition," refer
to a petition "in which specific actions, constituting denial of con-
stitutional right, are alleged to have resulted in petitioner's impris-
onment.' 12 Thus if a petition contains allegations as prescribed by
the court in its interpretation of "such petition," these allegations are
reviewable by the court. The practical result of this definitional scope
of review is that a court will not review a judgment based on a petition
which fails to show a constitutional denial, a petition which does not
court, but is an original proceeding in which a petitioner who complies with the require-
ments of the statute is entitled to a full judicial hearing upon the merits of the consti-
tutional claims asserted."
120 11. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964) provides: "Any final judgment
entered upon such petition may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as an appeal in civil
cases." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.23 (Page Supp. 1965) provides: "An order awarding
or denying relief sought in a petition filed pursuant to section 2953.21 of the Revised
Code shall be deemed a final judgment and may be appealed pursuant to Chapter 2505
of the Revised Code."
121 ]11. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
122 See McKeag v. People, 7 IMI. 2d 586, 587, 131 N.E.2d 517 (1956); People v.
Dolgin, 6 Ill. 2d 109, 126 N.E.2d 681 (1955); People v. Hyrciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 177, 125
N.E.2d 61, 62 (1955); People v. Joyce, 1 Ill. 2d 225, 226, 115 N.E.2d 262, 263 (1953).
123 People v. Joyce, supra note 122, at 227, 115 N.E.2d at 263.
124 In. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
125 People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133, 96 NXE.2d 449 (1951).
126 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, 122-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
127 Suprra note 125.
128 People v. Hartmnan, supra note 125, at 138, 96 N.E.2d at 451.
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clearly set forth the specific acts of denial,'129 nor a petition containing
a denial which was not presented to the lower court. 30 Hence, the only
petition which the court will review is a petition which clearly stated
a constitutional denial which was raised at the trial level and made
a part of the judgment.
Once the court decides that the petition is reviewable, it next
proceeds to examine the evidence presented during the post-convic-
tion hearing in support of the allegations. Its purpose for this ex-
amination is to determine if the judgment of the lower court was a
fair disposition of the petition when considered in the light of the
evidence presented. 3' In making this determination of fairness, the
court simultaneously complies with both the statutory right of review
and the petitioner's constitutional right to a complete remedy at the
state court level. 1 3
2
In reviewing the petition the court relies on the findings of fact
made by the post-conviction court because it had an opportunity to
see and hear the witnesses.'33 This reliance on the lower court's
findings of fact, while practical and even arguably necessary, results
in the Illinois Supreme Court's unwillingness to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the lower court.'34 In fact the court will only sub-
stitute its judgment when it finds that the lower court's determination
was manifestly erroneous."'
The court's use of the manifestly erroneous test has further
limited the scope of its review by defining the seriousness of the errors
that would serve as a basis for reversal. The result of this further
limitation is that the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the
statute is necessarily and directly reduced. The frustration of the
remedy occurs in an area between two polar bases for the hearing
court's determination: the manifestly erroneous basis and the close-
question basis wherein the issue of fact would be submitted to a jury
if it were a different proceeding. That area would include a situation
129 People v. Vitale, 3 Il. 2d 99, 104, 119 N.E.2d 784, 787 (1954).
130 People v. Nischt, 23 Ill. 2d 284, 288, 178 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1961); People v.
Reeves, supra note 113, at 559, 107 N.E.2d at 863.
131 People v. Jefferson, 24 Ill. 2d 398, 402, 182 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1962); People v. Kirk-
wood, 17 Ill. 2d 23, 33, 160 N.E.2d 766, 772 (1959).
132 Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
133 See Jackson v. People, 16 Ill. 2d 526, 529, 158 N.E.2d 589, 590 (1959); People
v. Alden, supra note 108, at 503, 155 N.E.2d at 620; Davies v. People, 10 Ill. 2d 11, 15,
139 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1956); McKeag v. People, supra note 122, at 588, 131 NXE.2d at 518.
'34 People v. Cummins, supra note 96, at 312, 111 N.E.2d at 310.
135 People v. Alden, supra note 108, at 503, 155 N.E.2d at 620; Davies v. People,
supra note 133, Reck v. People, 7 I1. 2d 261, 265, 130 N.E.2d 200, 202 (1955).
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in which the post-conviction petition was disposed of by the original
trial judge whose earlier decision of the guilt of the petitioner or the
exact issue at the hearing was, in his opinion, the proper decision.
Evidence presented at the hearing would then incur an additional
burden of persuasion because of the judge's belief in his earlier deci-
sion. Evidence, arguably sufficient before another hearing judge, might
fail before the original judge; on appeal the court's use of the mani-
festiy erroneous test would prevent reversal. Thus it would seem that
a less extreme test might better serve the objectives of the statute
and insure the fair and complete hearing contemplated by it. Effec-
tiveness would increase if the reviewing court would substitute its
judgment where the appeal presented a substantial doubt as to the
fairness of the lower court's findings. The substantial doubt test
would assist the court in carrying out its purpose of review,136 because
the lower court's disposition of the petition can also be unfair when the
correctness of the lower court's findings are in substantial doubt.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment has been to demonstrate the prob-
lems raised under the Illinois post-conviction remedy statute and their
resolution by the Illinois courts. Given the relative similarity of lan-
guage and objectives of the new Ohio act, it would seem to follow that
the Ohio lawyer and judge will experience some comparable, if not
identical, difficulties in the interpretation and application of the act.
Hence, it should be useful to examine the approaches used by states,
such as Illinois, under their post-conviction remedy acts in order to
acquire possible standards and guidelines consistent with United States
Supreme Court mandates for adequate post-conviction relief. It is hoped
that the analysis of the Illinois act will suggest not only a procedural
approach to the new Ohio act but a substantive inquiry into the
competing claims of adequate post-conviction relief and finality in
the criminal process.
Hugh James Stevenson
136 Supra note 131.
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